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ABSTRACT 
 
Informal institutions such as culture is contingent condition affecting opportunism in large 
shareholders' relationships (Sauerwald and Peng, 2013). Using the data from 2003 to 2012 of 
Chinese family firms, our research finds that the collusions of multiple large shareholders (MLS) 
caused by Chinese family-oriented collectivism culture lead to firm’s investment inefficiency, 
including overinvestment and underinvestment. Unlike prior literature focusing merely on the 
agency problems of management or controlling shareholders, this study provides evidence of the 
agency problems of MLS. From examining the relations and allocations of shareholders 
ownership, we provide shareholders’ collusions, a new theoretical perspective to explain the 
investment inefficiency in Chinese family firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n a world with principal–principal (PP) conflicts, there are agency problems between controlling and 
minority shareholders. Both formal and informal institutions will affect the conflicts of these two 
inhospitable groups (Peng and Sauerwald, 2012; Sauerwald and Peng, 2013). Scholars with a formal 
institution-based view suggest that the PP conflicts could be prevented by or declined with special internal 
governance mechanisms such as the existence of multiple large shareholders (MLS). They find that MLS plays a 
potentially restrictive role in alleviating the firm’s agency costs and information asymmetry between controlling and 
minority shareholders (Attig et al., 2013; Attig et al., 2009). Firm’s with MLS will (1) generate competition among 
block holders for control contest (Bloch and Hedge, 2001); (2) stimulate other shareholders’ monitoring motivation 
on the controlling shareholder (Pagano and Roell, 1998); (3) force other shareholders to form the balance of power 
with controlling shareholder (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000); (4) mitigate controlling shareholder’s moral hazard 
(Berkman et al., 2009); and finally increase enterprise values (Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, MLS is not always a good mechanism to protect the interests of minority shareholders. 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that there are coalition formation effects of the large shareholders in firms 
with PP conflicts. When it’s hard for one single shareholder to control the firm, coalescing with other large 
shareholders will make it easier. In fact, both formal and informal institutions will affect the PP conflicts, and 
informal institutions are complementary or substitutional with the formal institutions, especially in firms with weak 
formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Sauerwald and Peng (2013) pointed out that in emerging 
economies with relatively underdeveloped formal institutions for shareholders' rights protection, informal 
institutions will play an important role in corporate governance and affect the PP conflicts.  
 
Social context such as legal origin and culture will affect corporate insiders’ private benefit of control. 
Legal origin has important influence on firm’s micro-behaviors such as the arrangement of ownership structure and 
its economic consequences (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). However, under a context of poor legal protection and lack 
of law enforcement, culture often leads to systematic exploitation of the legal vacuum, finally prompte even 
I 
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immoral or illegal behaviors (Zhang et al 2013). China, a civil law-dominated country, has established its modern 
system of property rights at the beginning of the reform and opening up. There are MLS in Chinese firms, especially 
in firms controlled by family groups. But the history of modern property rights system is merely thirty years. 
Governed by moralities and ethics of Confucianism for more than two thousand years, most Chinese are 
collectivism-orientated and lack self-awareness, which is different from Westerners Anglo-Saxons. As a society of 
collectivism, China is greatly influenced by Confucianism, which stresses the consensus of opinions and encourages 
coordination. The modern system of property rights in Chinese family firms will show many non-property 
characteristics such as the existence of informal institutions. And MLS will play some other roles in corporate 
governance in China, or even ones totally opposite to the west. Simply transplanting formal institutions into another 
culture will result in weak formal institutions, and the informal institutions shaped by culture may play a central role 
in the emergence of PP conflicts (Sauerwald and Peng, 2013).  
 
This study contributes to the literature on the role of informal institutions in ownership arrangement and its 
economic consequence. First, our research reveals collusions are typical features in family firms with MLS. 
Although prior studies give an explosive attention on ownership structures and its arrangement (Morck et al., 1988; 
Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), the researches mainly investigate the static arrangement of ownership 
structure. We broaden the scope of researches of ownership structure on MLS by considering shareholders' 
relationships caused by family-oriented collectivism culture, an important informal institutions in China. Just as 
Faccio et al. (2001) argued, the presence of MLS will exacerbate controlling shareholder’s expropriation in Asia due 
to collusion incentive, which will have much difference as depicted in Attig et al. (2009). Second, using a unique 
data from Chinese family firms, we provide evidence that the informal institutions on MLS will generate poor 
economic consequence such as investment inefficiency. The research finds that collusions of MLS can lead to firm’s 
investment inefficiency, including overinvestment and underinvestment. This paper broadens the research of 
informal institutions in emerging economy. Although in formal institutions perspective, family ownership is an 
effective organizational structure (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), it will play an opposite governance effect in 
perspective of large shareholders' relationships caused by family-oriented collectivism culture.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the institutional backgrounds in 
China and Chinese family firms. Section 3 presents theoretical analysis and develops our research hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes data, variables and research models. Section 5 provides empirical tests and analyses. Section 6 
conducts necessary robust test. Sections 7 and 8 conclude this paper and present limitations of our approach and 
recommendations for future researches.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUNDS 
 
Types of Family Ownership and PP Conflicts of MLS 
 
Types of Family Ownership 
 
Chinese government started the property rights reform at the very beginning of its reform and opening up in 
late 1970s. Before that, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were the predominant type of ownership in China. But since 
then, the significance of SOEs declines steadily, and the proportion of non-SOEs such as family firms is increasing 
at a rather high rate. After the property rights reform, China established an economic system with state and non-state 
ownership. Within the economic system, state ownership is the leading factor, while other forms of non-state 
ownership such as family ownership coexist with it. But interestingly, property rights are more secure in SOEs than 
in non-SOEs, because government’s regulations have been less hostile to SOEs than to non-SOEs (Chen and Qian, 
1998). Until now, China still does not have well-specified property rights, and property rights protection in China is 
also not so good (Hung, 2008). 
 
The property rights reform gives rise to the emergence of family firms, which increasingly become an 
important economic subject in China. And family ownership promotes rapid development of China’s economy. 
Family firms play a prominent role in boosting economic growth and solving the problem of unemployment, etc. In 
family firms, the ownership is mainly controlled by family members or family groups. The linkages of family 
ownership are blood relations, kinships or marriage. Family members can assert identification with kin, hometown, 
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school, workplace, sworn brotherhood, and so on (Luo, 2007). Family shareholders also dominate the decision-
making procedure of firms’ major financial behaviors. The ownership and control rights of family firms often rest in 
the hands of family members. Family groups control a great majority of ownership, and the ownership they control 
may help them extract self-interests, and finally good for the family groups. 
 
Through the reform of property rights, there are three main types of shares in Chinese family firms, 
individual shares, corporate shares, and institutional shares. Individual shares are also known as natural person 
shares, the holders of which in a firm is individuals or natural person. Individual shares are most common stocks in 
family firms, which also include domestic individual shares and foreign individual shares. Corporate shares are also 
called legal person shares, the holders of which are companies or legal person. Corporate shareholders can be 
divided into domestic corporate shares, foreign corporate shares. Domestic corporate shares usually contain state-
owned corporate shares and non-state-owned corporate shares. Institutional shares are stocks that are held by 
institutional investors such as securities, funds, insurances, trusts, and finance companies. In addition, there are also 
B shares and H shares in Chinese family firms. B shares are those held by foreign investors, and traded in foreign 
currencies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. H shares are stocks issued by firms listed in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and are generally held by Hong Kong investors, including individual investors and institutional 
investors. Figure 1 displays the different types of shares in Chinese family firms. 
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Figure 1.  Different types of shares in Chinese family firms 
 
 
PP Conflicts of MLS 
 
Principle-agent (PA) conflicts between owners and managers and principle-principle (PP) conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders are two predominant models of corporate governance within all national 
contexts (Young et al., 2008). However, in emerging economies, the PP conflicts are more severe for reason of weak 
internal governance mechanisms and poor institutional protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997). In 
such emerging economies as China, the ownership is highly concentrated and the divergence between cash-flow 
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rights and control rights is large, while PA conflicts are generally limited and PP conflicts are severe (Claessens et 
al., 2002).  
 
Many researches reveal that family ownership is a major cause of PP conflicts in emerging markets. Family 
control has two opposite effects on the governance of family firms. On one hand, family control can reduce 
monitoring costs and mitigate PA conflicts. On the other hand, family control may increase the likelihood of 
expropriation of non-family minority shareholders by the controlling family groups. In their earlier research of PP 
conflicts in family firms, Claessens et al. (2000) find that managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the 
controlling shareholder or his family members in East Asian corporations. And managers are usually related to the 
family groups of the controlling shareholder (Claessens et al., 2002). Chinese family owners also prefer to appoint 
family members as CEOs to guarantee control and protect the interests of family groups (Cai et al., 2012). Family 
members as CEOs will make benefit extraction easier and eventually exacerbate the PP conflicts. Hence, in 
emerging markets with poor protection of minority shareholders, the PA conflicts between managers and owners are 
usually minor, and the PP conflicts between family and non-family groups are dominant in family-controlled firms. 
 
Multiple large shareholders (MLS) in Chinese family firms are common. According to the statistics in 
Chen et al. (2009), in Chinese family firms, the average ratio of shares held by controlling shareholder is about 
32.14% and 11.96% and 5.13% is held by the 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders, respectively. However, in SOEs 
controlled by central government, the ownership is more concentrated and the largest shareholder accounts for 
51.79% of issued shares. Literatures on corporate governance finds that MLS can strengthen other large 
shareholders’ monitoring effect on controlling shareholder and shape the ability of MLS to exert governance in 
Chinese family firms (Luo et al., 2013; Cai et al., 2012). However, many of the researches fail to consider family 
relations caused by informal institutions such as family-oriented collectivism. Family relations tend to make the PP 
conflicts more difficult to resolve due to self-control and other problems engendered by altruism among family 
members (Schulze et al., 2001). Failure to understand the institutional nature of PP conflicts in emerging economies 
will make corporate governance mechanism irrelevant and counterproductive (Peng et al., 2008).  
 
Despite the co-existence of MLS with various types of shares within Chinese family firms, we don’t 
exactly know the interrelations among holders of individual, corporate and institutional shares. How many forms of 
interrelations are there between controlling shareholder and other large shareholders? What will influence the 
interrelations and how to classify them? Will the governance mechanism be changed or reversed when we take the 
informal institutions into our consideration?  
 
China's Family-Oriented Collectivism Culture and Classification of Large Shareholders  
 
China's family-oriented collectivism culture  
 
Institutions are ancient constraints that possess economic behaviors and interactions. They are consist of 
both formal institutions such as laws, property rights and ownership arrangements, and informal institutions such as 
cultures, norms and beliefs. (North, 1991).  Peng and Heath (1996) suggest that informal institutions arise to play a 
more important role in driving firm performance in situations where formal institutions are weak. The aim of 
property rights reform in China is to establish effective formal institutions as in west economies. But things don’t 
turn out the way we want. Merely three decades of reform cannot withstand thousands of years of family-oriented 
collectivism culture. In China, informal institutions have substitutive features, whereby informal institutions 
substitute for the ineffective formal institutions (Estrin and Prevezer, 2011).  
 
 
 Sauerwald and Peng (2013) argue that culture is a contingent condition affecting opportunism in large 
shareholders' relationships, and finally play a central role in the emergence of PP conflicts. In China, the 
collectivism culture leads to personal relationships. Shapiro et al. (2003) find personal relationships are deeply 
embedded in Chinese culture, and all social interactions, including business, are carried out via it, primarily within 
the family network. Close personal relationships are established through families. The family members include not 
only the father, the mother, siblings, but also other relatives and friends, even those from the same place or having 
the same dialect. Personal relationships are not so important in Westerners and cannot be understood apart from the 
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collectivism culture (Fukuyama, 1995).  
 
In Chinese family firms, the propensity to conduct financial behaviors through informal networks such as 
personal relationships is a reflection of Chinese family culture. Without a strong reliable formal institutions in 
Chinese social context, people had to rely more on family members. There exist objectively the dual characteristics 
of ‘family’ and ‘firm’ in Chinese family firms. As a ‘family’, the run of the family is often irrational (e.g. close knit 
of blood relationships and maximization of the whole family’s interests) and more in line with subjective purpose of 
family members. Hence, there are two features in Chinese family firms. First, family firms pursue Chinese family-
oriented collectivism culture, which is the core value of Confucianism. According to the family-oriented 
collectivism culture, individuals are fundamentally social or relational beings, and they always view themselves as 
interdependent with the social context because of the influence of Confucianism (Luo, 2007). Chinese family-
oriented collectivism culture advocates cohesion and loyalty within the family network, but discrimination and 
hostility outside it. Second, the governance of family firms follows the social models of ‘father to son’ or ‘elder to 
younger’. The sons or the young show great respect for fathers or the old, and absolute obedience to their commands 
and orders. This constitutes the ethnic features of Chinese family culture. Unfortunately, this may lead to abuse of 
family rights or corruption among family members.  
 
Classification of Large Shareholders  
 
In Chinese family firm, large shareholders includes controlling shareholder and non-controlling large 
shareholders. Controlling shareholder is firm's largest shareholder, and non-controlling large shareholders are the 
several largest after the controlling shareholder, for example, the 2nd and 3rd or to the 5th largest shareholders (Lv et 
al., 2012). We divide the controlling and non-controlling large shareholders into three different groups such as 
family-group shareholders, state-owned shareholders, and institutional-hold shareholders. Family-group 
shareholders contain the holders of domestic individual shares and of non-state-owned corporate shares. State-
owned shareholders indicate the holders of state-owned corporate shares. Institutional investors and the holders of 
foreign individual shares, foreign corporate shares, B shares and H shares are involved in institutional-hold 
shareholders. Three different dimensions of controlling and non-controlling large shareholders are displayed in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Three different groups of controlling and non-controlling large shareholders 
 
The reasons why we group together the holders of domestic individual shares and of non-state-owned 
corporate shares is that in Chinese family firms, the former are usually family members and the latter are usually 
companies controlled by family members or family groups. One example of a family firm that has relations of MLS 
is Shenzhen Zero-Seven Co., Ltd. (Zero-Seven, henceforth). Zero-Seven is a company of mineral marketing and 
hotel management, which has been listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (000007.SZ) in 1992. The controlling 
shareholder of Zero-Seven is a non-state-owned companies, Guangzhou Bo-Rong Investment Co., Ltd. (Bo-Rong 
Investment, henceforth), holding 17.41% of total outstanding shares. The 2nd largest shareholder is a domestic 
individual shareholder Mr. Lian Weifei, the president of the board of Zero-Seven, holding 10.82% of total 
outstanding shares. Furthermore, the actual controller of Bo-Rong Investment is Ms. Li Chengbi, the president of the 
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board of Bo-Rong Investment and vice-president of the board of Zero-Seven. What's interesting is the personal 
identity of Ms. Li Chengbi as the mother in law of the 2nd largest shareholder, Mr. Lian Weifei. Although we find 
the relationship between controlling and the 2nd largest shareholders from the annual reports of Zero-Seven, the 
relations with the 3rd or other largest shareholders cannot be found directly merely through the information disclosed 
by Zero-Seven. But culling from media reports, we find the 3rd largest shareholder Mr. Su Guangwei (holds 9.09% 
of total outstanding shares) colluded with the 2nd largest shareholder Mr. Lian Weifei to have gained huge private 
benefits through seasoned equity offering in 2010. In reality, the controlling shareholder Bo-Rong Investment and 
non-controlling large shareholders Mr. Lian Weifei and Mr. Su Guangwei form a labyrinth of relationships. Some of 
the relationships can be found directly, but more of them cannot. Figure 3 displays the ownership structure, control 
map and relations of MLS in Zero-Seven. 
 
Figure 3. Ownership structure, control map and relations of MLS in Zero-Seven (2012) 
 
In addition, the other two groups, state-owned shareholders and institutional-hold shareholders, have very 
different interest orientations and selections with the family-group shareholders. The governance effects of state-
owned and institutional-hold shareholders will be influenced by these different interests (Wei et al., 2005). Wei et al. 
(2005) argue that in Chinese family firms the holders of state-owned legal person shares are more profit-oriented 
and have more incentives to monitor the firm. As holder of state-owned shares is central or local government, their 
primary interest may be more political, such as maintaining employment, and relationships would not seem so 
important as natural person shareholders. Furthermore, many studies reveal that institutional investors and foreign 
investors have positive effect on corporate governance or play an effective role in monitoring the expropriation of 
large shareholders (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Bai et al., 2004). 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Theoretical Analysis 
 
As PP conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, the origination of PP conflicts between 
large shareholders (controlling shareholder and non-controlling large shareholders) and minority shareholders is also 
the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Comparing with the absolute concentration ownership structure 
in SOEs, we argue that the relatively dispersed ownership structure in family firms increases the complexity of the 
governance of MLS. Controlling shareholder is no longer absolutely controller, and other large shareholders doesn't 
take it silently when confronted with controlling shareholder’s decision. It is not too easy for controlling shareholder 
to implement a decision without other large shareholders' help. Hence, there are coalitions among controlling 
shareholder and non-controlling large shareholders in Chinese family firms. In this paper, we argue the coalitions 
among large shareholders may be harmful to minority shareholders, or may also be harmless. If the coalitions are no 
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harm to the minority shareholders, the coalitions are defined as collaborations. Otherwise, they are defined as 
collusions. We believe that collusions of MLS occur predominantly in firms with controlling shareholders holding 
less than 50% of outstanding shares. The control power of controlling shareholders are too strong when they holds 
more than 50% of outstanding shares, they don't need non-controlling large shareholders' collusions to expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
 
 Although PA conflicts are less prevalent in family firms, family control gives rise to PP conflicts, leading 
to expropriation of the wealth of minority shareholders by family owners particular in legal regimes where the 
protection of minority shareholders is low (Maury, 2006). Family ownership is the predominant mode of governance 
in emerging and developing economies, and the weakness of legal system and judicial enforcement make family ties 
highly significant (Steier, 2009). In family group, the controllers of subsidiaries or sister companies belongs to the 
same family group, and interlocking networks among family controllers can allow funds to flow quickly into 
promising new businesses. Hence, the PP conflicts of MLS will let the private benefits of control becomes easier to 
obtain. The collusions of MLS will give the family controlling group sufficient voting power to control the firm. 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that in family-controlled firms there are coalitions among family owners. The 
incentive to collude or not depends on the type of large shareholders. They assume that the coalition between family 
members is easy to create and sustain, but a coalition between a family and non-family members might not be that 
interested in private benefit extraction. Hence, it is important to consider the identities of non-controlling large 
shareholders when examining the influence of MLS on corporate governance (Cheng et al., 2013). 
 
Collusions will affect firm’s performance and eventually harm to minority shareholders. Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) find that a higher voting rights held by another family owner is negatively related to firm value, whereas a 
higher voting rights is positively related to firm value if the voting rights were hold by another non-family owner, 
typically a financial institution. In reality, private benefits of control are larger in collectivist as opposed to 
individualist cultures, and the PP conflicts are also severe in collectivism cultures (Zhang et al, 2013). In China, the 
Chinese family-oriented collectivism has negative effects on firm’s performance, and Chinese firms have 
significantly poorer financial performance than their Western counterparts (Li et al., 2000). Using unique data from 
Chinese market, Cheng et al. (2013) find that firm’s value is lower when its non-controlling large shareholders have 
relations with the controlling shareholder, especially in firms that are controlled by family group.  
 
Although the PP conflicts of MLS will affect firm’s performance, we have little evidence of their effects on 
business strategies such as investment strategy in Chinese family firms. Informal institution such as family-oriented 
collectivism culture in Chinese societies has a significant influence on the business strategies of Chinese firms, 
because individuals are likely to stress kinship and friendship in doing business (Li et al., 2000). In this paper, we 
address the following research questions: How does the existence of MLS influence firm’s business strategies such 
as investment strategy when considering the informal institutions in Chinese family firms? Will the non-controlling 
large shareholders be partners in crime with controlling shareholder? Will the collusions of MLS lead to investment 
inefficiency in Chinese family firms? The reason that we choose investment strategy in our research is that 
investment policy meets the purpose of controlling shareholder's empire building (Stulz, 1990) and has the features 
of collusions among largest shareholders (Pindado et al., 2011).  
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
We argue that information asymmetry between inside family-groups and outside investors, and PP conflicts 
of MLS are two key factors that will affect firm’s investment. There are two main aspects of information asymmetry 
between inside family-groups and outside investors, information asymmetry about relationships of inside family 
members and about investment strategy. For one hand, outside minority investors usually don’t know the exact 
relations between controlling and non-controlling large shareholders. Although information disclosure is required by 
Chinese laws (Security Law-no. 86, Accounting Standards for Enterprises-no. 36, Administration of Information 
Disclosure-no. 48), for example, the disclosure of information about related parties and persons acting in concert, 
the information contains only shares holding by controllers and their near relatives. Other information, such as 
friend relationships or working relationships, is voluntary or impossible to disclose. The inadequacy of information 
will eventually lead that minority shareholders cannot fix the actual relationships of MLS in Chinese family firms. 
For the other, insiders have the private information of investment strategy, while minority outsiders don’t have. 
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Asymmetric information serves to constrain the investment decision of firms such as pass up positive-NPV 
investments or accept negative-NPV investments (Myers and Majiluf, 1984). Family firms will disclose significant 
investment information, but family ties behind the investment are rarely disclosed.  
 
Furthermore, PP conflicts of MLS will let the investments benefit inside family-groups and harm outside 
minority shareholders. Insiders have a preference for empire building (Stulz, 1990). In Chinese family firms, family 
controllers will spend the money on investment projects that are beneficial to the family group. In a family 
conglomerate, family members always control more than one firm, and there is no difficulty for them to transfer the 
resources from one firm to another. Controlling and non-controlling large shareholders share benefit extraction or 
expropriation in line with the benefits of the whole family groups will lead to collusions of them. The CEO and 
other managers are usually family members or have close personal ties with the family groups (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2006), so they will accelerate the benefit expropriation behaviors of controlling and non-controlling large 
shareholders. With the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, the benefit expropriation will become 
easier and more convenient.  
 
Under a context with PP conflict of controlling shareholders, the separation of control rights and cash flow 
rights can generate incentives to divert resources, and finally leads to non-value maximizing investment (Morck et 
al., 2005). The inefficient investment is larger in firms in which a controlling shareholder has smaller cash flow 
rights. Pindado and de la Torre (2009) suggest that overinvestment and underinvestment problems are more likely to 
happen in firms that large shareholders have the ability to expropriate minority investors. The root of PP conflicts of 
MLS is also the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. PP conflicts of MLS will make private benefits of 
control easier to obtain. In a context with PP conflict of MLS, resources are allocated among different groups, 
especially in firms controlled by firmly members or family groups. Actually the efficient allocation of resources 
within a group can exacerbate the inefficient allocation of resources across groups (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). 
Pindado et al. (2011) find in family firm, the family 2nd largest shareholder will collude with the controlling 
shareholder in investment decision-making process. 
 
With a poor protection of minority shareholders from formal institutions in China, informal institutions 
play an important role in allocation of resources. The relations caused by Chinese family-oriented collectivism 
culture, such as kinship, friendship and working relationship are vital in allocation of resources in family firms. In a 
family conglomerate, the resources are allocated from family firms to family shareholders or to other firms 
controlled by family members for reason of the collusions of MLS. The inefficient allocation of resources will 
eventually generate investment inefficiency in Chinese family firms, such as overinvestment and underinvestment. 
Hence, we present the following Hypothesis H1. 
 
Hypothesis H1. Ceteris paribus, collusions of MLS in Chinese family firms are positively correlated with firm’s 
investment inefficiency. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and Data 
 
Our primary data are from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database for the period 
2003 to 2012. The sample includes 3665 firm-year observations for family firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Chinese Stock Exchanges. Controlling shareholders in our sample all hold less than 50% of outstanding shares, 
because in firms with controlling shareholder holds more than 50%, non-controlling large shareholders will 
subordinate to rather than collude with the controlling shareholder. In our empirical study, we winsorize all ratios at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of extreme observations. 
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Measures 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Consistent with prior researches such as Richardson (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009), we measure 
investment inefficiency as the deviations from expected investment using an investment expectation model that 
predicts investment as a function of series of variables. The investment expectation model is as follows: 
 
new investment expenditure=f(X) 
 
In the investment expectation model, the dependent variable is new investment expenditure, measured as 
cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement minus 
cash receipts from selling these assets, scaled by initial total assets. The independent variables in the prediction 
model are: (1)lag value of new investment expenditure, which is used to measure the investment expenditure prior to 
the investment year; (2)lag value of revenue growth, which is used to measure firm’s growth opportunities prior to 
the investment year; (3)lag value of leverage, which measures the level of short term and long term debt prior to the 
investment year, deflated by beginning total assets; (4)lag value of cash, which measures the balance of cash and 
short term investments prior to the investment year, deflated by beginning total assets; (5)lag value of age, which 
equals the log of the number of years the firm has been listed on Shanghai or Shenzhen Exchange prior to the 
investment year; (6)lag value of stock returns, which measures firm’s stock return prior to the investment year; 
(7)lag value of size, which equals the log of beginning total assets prior to the investment year; and industry and 
year dummy variables.  
 
Positive deviation from expected investment is defined as overinvestment (over invest), and negative 
deviation from expected investment is defined as underinvestment (under invest). Both overinvestment and 
underinvestment are measures of inefficient investments (invest inefficiency). To ease explanation, we multiply the 
variable under invest by -1 so that a higher value suggests a more severe underinvestment.  
 
Independent variables 
 
We first define variable MLS coalition3 to measure the coalitions of the top3 largest shareholders in 
Chinese family firms. MLS coalition3 is calculated as follows: 
 
MLS coalition3 = 3*L1 + 2*I*L2 + 1*I*L3 
 
Where Arabic numbers “3”, “2” and“1” represent the voting strength of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders, 
respectively. Following the oceanic games proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), in an oceanic game, voting 
strength, as measured by the weights of players’ value equation, is inhomogeneously distributed and has no effect on 
the major players. So we use constant figures to represent the voting strength of MLS. L1, L2 and L3 are ratios of 
shares holding by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders, respectively. L1, L2 and L3 represent the controlling power 
of top3 largest shareholders. I is a binary variable, which equals one if the 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders belongs to 
controlling shareholder’s family group, and zero otherwise. 
 
According to our theoretical analysis, coalitions include collaborations and collusions. Collusions will harm 
to minority shareholders, and collaborations are harmless. Hence, we argue that in Chinese family firms, collusions 
are main factors that cause investment inefficiency, and collaborations have no effect on investment inefficiency. 
We then build three models to estimate the collusions of the top3 largest shareholders, MLS collusion3, MLS 
collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U. The models are as follows: 
 
MLS coalition3=f(X) 
 
In the models, the dependent variable is MLS coalition3 and independent variables are invest inefficiency, 
or over invest or under invest, respectively. We calculate collaborations as equal to coalitions when there are zero 
deviations from expected investment, which means there is neither overinvestment nor underinvestment. That is, 
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collaborations equal to the intercepts of the estimation model, which are intercept1, or intercept2 or intercept3 when 
the independent variables in the estimation models are invest inefficiency, or over invest or under invest, 
respectively. In our estimation models, we do our regressions for each industry-year. We finally calculate variables 
MLS collusion3, MLS collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U as follows: 
 
MLS collusion3= MLS coalition3- intercept1 
MLS collusion3_O= MLS coalition3- intercept2 
MLS collusion3_U= MLS coalition3- intercept3 
 
Control Variables 
 
To be consistent with the literature, our regression model includes four main control variables, industry and 
year dummies. The four main control variables are monetary policy, free cash flow, control contest, and board size, 
while monetary policy is macro factor, and the other three variables are micro factors.  
 
 
 Monetary policy is measured as the growth rate of the supply of broad money (M2). Hubbard (1998) 
argued that contractionary monetary policy can raise the cost of external financing in firms with finance constraints. 
The investment will fall when firms are in face of contractionary monetary policy, and the finance constraints are 
not so large when firms are in the context of accommodative monetary policy. Thus, monetary policy affects firm’s 
investment. All else being equal, accommodative monetary policy will lead to firm’s overinvestment, and 
contractionary monetary policy is correlated with underinvestment. 
 
Free cash flow is used to study the effect of firm’s operating activities on investment. Following 
Richardson (2006), we measure free cash flow as cash flow from operating activities, plus research and development 
expenditure, less reported depreciation and amortization, and less the predicted value of new investment expenditure 
in investment expectation model. Firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to overinvestment, and firms 
with negative free cash flow are more likely to underinvestment (Richardson, 2006). 
 
Control contest is used to study the effect of shareholders’ governance mechanism on investment. We use 
Z index to measure the control contest between controlling and non-controlling large shareholders, and it equals to 
the ratio of shares holding by the 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders over shares holding by the 1st largest shareholder. 
To enlarge the variation of the Z index, following Lv et al. (2012), we use the Herfindahl index to substitute for the 
numerator and denominator of the Z-index. We predict control contest have negative effect on investment 
inefficiency.  
 
Board size is used to study the effect of managers’ governance mechanism on investment. Board size is 
measured as the log of the number of directors. The literatures find that large board increases problems of 
communication and coordination between directors and leads to agency problems. Thus, we predict board size have 
positive effect on investment inefficiency. 
 
The Model 
 
We build three regression models to examine the effect of collusions of MLS on investment inefficiency in 
Chinese family firms. Model 1 is used to investigate the main effect of shareholders' collusions on investment 
inefficiency; model 2 and model 3 are used to investigate the effects of shareholders' collusions on investment 
inefficiency in firms with overinvestment and underinvestment, respectively. In model 1, the dependent variable is 
investment inefficiency, independent variables contain MLS collusion3 and control variables. In model 2, the 
dependent variable is over invest, independent variables contain MLS collusion3_O and control variables. In model 
3, the dependent variable is under invest, independent variables contain MLS collusion3_U and control variables. 
 
In addition, we also build three regression through the origin model to investigate the influence of 
shareholders' collusions on investment inefficiency for reason that we have removed the intercepts when calculating 
MLS collusion3, MLS collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U. All of above six models are estimated by OLS with 
robust standard errors.  
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations for main variables in our sample. We 
find the mean value of invest inefficiency is 0.0347, which suggests the investment inefficiency in Chinese family 
firms are not so large. The investment inefficiency of over invest (mean=0.55) is larger than that of under invest 
(mean=-0.033). The collusions of the top3 largest shareholders MLS collusion3_U (mean=0.0091) in firms with 
underinvestment is larger than that in firms with overinvestment, MLS collusion3_O (mean=0.0008).  
 
 In correlation analysis, MLS collusion3 and MLS collusion3_U are positively with invest inefficiency 
(r=0.0428 and p<0.01) and under invest (r=0.045 and p<0.05), respectively, suggesting the investment inefficiency 
in firms with collusions of MLS is low, which preliminarily supports our former hypothesis H1. Control variable 
free cash flow is negatively with invest inefficiency(r=-0.1203, p<0.01), over invest(r=-0.045, p<0.1), under invest 
(r=-0.1815, p<0.01), which shows significant negative influence of firm's free cash flow. Furthermore, the 
significantly and negatively correlation coefficients between MLS collusion3 and control contest (r=-0.2169, 
p<0.01) reveal the validity of our measure of collusions of MLS. In firms with higher control contest among large 
shareholders, the collusions within them will lower, and vice versa. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Invest 
inefficiencya 0.0347 0.0331          
2  Over invstb 0.5500 0.2388          
3 Under 
investc -0.0330 0.0303          
4 MLS 
collusion3a 0.0100 0.3581 0.0428
***         
5 MLS 
collusion3_Od 0.0008 0.3627  0.0404        
6 MLS 
collusion3_Ue 0.0091 0.3352   0.0450**       
7 Free cash 
flowa -0.0168 0.0935 -0.1203
*** -0.0450* -0.1815*** -0.0668*** -0.0844*** -0.0409*    
8 Monetary 
policya 0.1803 0.0370 -0.0271 -0.0416 -0.0179 0.0121 -0.0086 0.0159 0.0680
***   
9 Control 
contesta 0.6039 0.4227 0.0040 0.0207 -0.0056 -0.2169
*** -0.2230*** -0.1849*** -0.0158 -0.0301*  
10 Board sizea 2.1525 0.2034 0.0271 0.0282 0.0250 -0.0099 -0.0519** 0.0131 -0.0140 -0.0039 0.0975*** 
a n=3665, b n=1476, c n=2199, d n=1464, e n=2189. 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. All two-tailed tests. 
 
Regression Results  
 
Table 2 reports the regression results of investment inefficiency (including overinvestment and 
underinvestment) on the collusions of MLS, which explores the influence of top3 largest shareholders’ collusions on 
investment in Chinese family firms. In regression with intercept models, model 1 shows that MLS collusion3 is 
positively and significantly related to investment inefficiency ( =β 0.0038, p<0.01), supporting hypothesis H1. In 
model 2 and model 3, the coefficients of MLS collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U are both significantly positive at 
the level of 0.05, which means the collusions of MLS have positive effects on over invest and under invest. The 
result suggests that Chinese collectivism culture will affect the opportunism in large shareholders' relationships, and 
finally play an important role in the emergence of PP conflicts of MLS in Chinese family firms.  
 
 In regression through origin models, we get the same results as in regression with intercept models. The 
coefficients of MLS collusion3, MLS collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U are significantly positive with dependent 
variables investment inefficiency, over invest and under invest, respectively. Hypothesis H1 also supported by the 
regression results in model 1', model 2' and model 3'. Furthermore, the F-value and Adj-R2 in model 1' (F=809.25, 
Adj-R2=0.5284), model 2' (F=291.86, Adj-R2=0.5011) and model 3'  (F=729.89, Adj-R2=0.6359) are larger than that 
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in model 1 (F=10.34, Adj-R2=0.016), model 2 (F=5.51, Adj-R2=0.0156) and model 3 (F=8.16, Adj-R2=0.0208), 
suggesting the goodness of fit in regression through origin models is better than that in regression with intercept 
models. The regression through origin models are more appropriate to test our research hypothesis when the 
intercept is removed in calculating MLS collusion3, MLS collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U. 
 
 The regression results of control variables shown in Table 2 reveal negative coefficients of free cash flow, 
which suggests that the investment in Chinese family firms the overinvestment or underinvestment doesn't refer to 
firms' free cash flow. There may be underinvestment even if firms have sufficient cash flow, and vice versa. 
Monetary policy has negative influence on over invest ( β = -0.0643 in Model 2, p<0.01) and positive influence on 
under invest ( β = 0.0293 in Model 3', p<0.05), suggesting the contractibility of monetary policy. Non-significant 
coefficients of control contest suggest that in Chinese family firm with collusions of MLS, the investment 
inefficiency isn’t directly influenced by control contest between controlling and non-controlling large shareholders. 
The significantly positive coefficients of board size suggest firms with larger board size are more likely to 
investment inefficiency, including overinvestment or underinvestment.  
 
Table 2. Collusions of top3 largest shareholders and investment inefficiency 
 Regression with intercept models (OLS) Regression through origin models (OLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1' Model 2' Model 3' 
Intercept 0.0274*** 0.0264*** 0.0206***    
 (4.64) (2.72) (3.67)    
MLS collusion3 0.0038***   0.0040***   
 (2.54)   (2.63)   
MLS collusion3_O  0.0031**   0.0033**  
  (2.47)   (2.56)  
MLS collusion3_U   0.0034**   0.0034** 
   (2.22)   (2.23) 
Free cash flow -0.0397*** -0.0259** -0.0306*** -0.0410*** -0.0257** -0.0323*** 
 (-6.04) (-2.17) (-5.74) (-6.22) (-2.15) (-6.07) 
Monetary policy -0.0150 -0.0645*** 0.0086 0.0122 -0.0386* 0.0293** 
 (-1.06) (-2.73) (0.65) (0.97) (-1.82) (2.47) 
Control contest 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.20) (0.01) (-0.17) (0.50) (0.16) (0.08) 
Board size 0.0043* 0.0108*** 0.0026 0.0145*** 0.0207*** 0.0103*** 
 (1.75) (2.66) (1.10) (12.79) (10.44) (9.83) 
F-value 10.34*** 5.82*** 8.16*** 809.25*** 290.15*** 729.89*** 
No.(firm-year) 3665 1464 2086 3665 1464 2086 
Adj-R2 0.0147 0.0111 0.0185 0.5277 0.4995 0.6386 
T-values are in parentheses.* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. All two-tailed tests. 
 
ROBUSTNESS 
 
We build new variables MLS collusion5, MLS collusion5_O and MLS collusion5_U to test the influence of 
the collusions of top5 largest shareholders on investment inefficiency in Chinese family firms. The calculation 
method of MLS collusion5 is the same as MLS collusion3, which equals to the coalitions of the top5 largest 
shareholders (MLS coalition5) minus intercept term from an estimation model. In the estimation model, the 
dependent variable is MLS coalition5 and independent variable is invest inefficiency. The calculation of MLS 
coalition5 is as follows:  
 
MLS coalition5 = 5*L1 + 4*I*L2+3*I*L3 + 2*I*L4 +1*I*L5 
 
Where Arabic numbers “5” to “1” represents the voting strength of 1st largest shareholder to the 5th largest 
shareholder, respectively. L1 to L5 are ratios of shares holding by 1st largest shareholder to 5th largest shareholder, 
respectively. The calculation method of MLS collusion5_O and MLS collusion5_U is also the same as MLS 
collusion3_O and MLS collusion3_U. 
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 The regression results of the collusions of top5 largest shareholders and investment inefficiency are listed 
in Table 3. Model 1 to model 3 are regression with intercept models, and model 1' to model 3' are regression through 
origin models. In model 1 and model 1', the dependent variable is investment inefficiency, independent variables 
contain MLS collusion5 and control variables. In model 2 and model 2', the dependent variable is over invest, 
independent variables contain MLS collusion5_O and control variables. In model 3 and model 3', the dependent 
variable is under invest, independent variables contain MLS collusion5_U and control variables. 
 
 According to Table 3, OLS estimation of the six models get same results as in Table 2, and the goodness of 
fit in regression through origin models is better than that in regression with intercept models. To be specific, MLS 
collusion5 is positively and significantly related with investment inefficiency in model 1 ( β = 0.0022, p<0.05, Adj-
R2=0.0156) and model 1' ( β = 0.0023, p<0.05, Adj-R2=0.5261), MLS collusion5_O is positively and significantly 
related with over invest in model 2 ( =β 0.0013, p<0.01, Adj-R2=0.0108) and model 2' ( β = 0.0014, p<0.01, Adj-
R2=0.4989), and MLS collusion5_U is also positively and significantly related with under invest in model 3 ( β =
0.0023, p<0.01, Adj-R2=0.0195) and model 3' ( β = 0.0023, p<0.01, Adj-R2=0.6390). The results suggest that the 
collusions of top5 largest shareholders have positive effects on firm's investment inefficiency, which also supporting 
hypothesis H1. In Chinese family firms, informal institution such as family-oriented collectivism culture will affect 
the PP conflicts of MLS. 
 
Table 3. Collusions of top5 largest shareholders and investment inefficiency 
 Regression with intercept models (OLS) Regression through origin models (OLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1' Model 2' Model 3' 
Intercept 0.0275*** 0.0262*** 0.0206***    
 (4.63) (2.69) (3.68)    
MLS collusion3 0.0022**   0.0023**   
 (2.37)   (2.46)   
MLS collusion3_O  0.0013***   0.0014***  
  (2.75)   (2.81)  
MLS collusion3_U   0.0023***   0.0023*** 
   (2.67)   (2.66) 
Free cash flow -0.0413*** -0.0259** -0.0304*** -0.0426*** -0.0257** -0.0321*** 
 (-6.17) (-2.16) (-5.72) (-6.35) (-2.14) (-6.04) 
Monetary policy -0.0141 -0.0637*** 0.0084 0.0133 -0.0379* 0.0291** 
 (-0.99) (-2.68) (0.63) (1.05) (-1.78) (2.45) 
Control contest 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0011 0.0002 
 (0.57) (0.46) (-0.09) (0.85) (0.59) (0.18) 
Board size 0.0041* 0.0105*** 0.0025 0.0143*** 0.0203*** 0.0102 
 (1.67) (2.59) (1.09) (12.57) (10.23) (9.79) 
F-value 10.78 6.13 8.64 804.35 289.01 730.99 
No.(firm-year) 3665 1460 2086 3665 1460 2086 
Adj-R2 0.0156 0.0108 0.0195 0.5261 0.4989 0.6390 
T-values are in parentheses.* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. All two-tailed tests. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In situations where formal institutions are weak, informal institutions such as collectivism culture will play 
a more important role in driving personal networks and relationships (Peng and Heath, 1996). In this paper, we 
depict a scenario where non-controlling large shareholders have incentive to collude with the controlling shareholder 
in Chinese family firms. We study the effect of informal institutions on investment efficiency using the data from 
2003 to 2012 of Chinese family firms. We find that the collusions of MLS can lead to firm’s investment 
inefficiency, such as overinvestment and underinvestment. Our research reveals that ownership structures with MLS 
exacerbate agency problems when taking the family ties and relations that are caused by informal institutions sun as 
Chinese family-oriented collectivism culture into consideration.  
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In practical work, our research will provide a new perspective for the protection of minority shareholders. 
In Chinese family firms, non-controlling large shareholders will collaborate or collude with the controlling 
shareholder in firms with MLS. The collaborations will good for (at least no harm to) the benefits of minority 
shareholders, but the collusions will harm them. Current researches just reveal positive effects such as collaborations 
of MLS on corporate governance. But there was no getting away from the fact that there were negative effects of 
MLS on corporate governance. Thus, maybe it doesn’t work when blindly emphasizing to build ownership 
structures with MLS in Chinese family firms. The ties and relations among family shareholders will let the 
governance mechanisms of MLS become invalid. In practice, policymakers should not only focus on the formal 
institutions of MLS such as the balance mechanisms of controlling and non-controlling large shareholders, but also 
the relationships of them. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
As an exploratory research in the field of informal institutions of MLS, we argue that our study may have 
several limitations that future research should address. First, there will be some other more detailed classifications 
on the controlling and non-controlling large shareholders in Chinese family firms, such as directly categorize them 
into different groups according to kinship, friendship and working relationship. Future researches should calculate 
the collusions of MLS according to more detailed classifications. Second, the categorisation of any corporate 
shareholders among family-group shareholders ex-ante eliminates any possibility of their independence. Although 
the collaboration to a certain extent can reflect the independence of family-group shareholders, it is possible to 
imagine that there are two large family groups compete for the ownership of a company. Future researchers should 
take the competition into consideration when calculating the collusions of MLS. Third, we didn’t explore the 
collusions between family shareholders and non family shareholders. Under particular circumstances, there will be 
collusions between family and non family shareholders such as institutional shareholders (Hou et al., 2011). Future 
studies should address the relations and tie of family and non-family shareholders. 
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